Notes on Logical Form and Types of Coreference by Nishigauchi, Taisuke
Osaka University
TitleNotes on Logical Form and Types of Coreference
Author(s)Nishigauchi, Taisuke
CitationOsaka Literary Review. 17 P.28-P.43
Issue Date1978-12-25
Text Versionpublisher
URL http://hdl.handle.net/11094/25655
DOI
Rights
Notes on Logical Form and Types of Coreference*
Taisuke Nishigauchi
1. Types of  Core  ference and Diversity of Pronouns 
1.1 It is widely assumed that the relation of linguistically relevant 
 coreference1) is naturally expressed by means of identical referential 
indices attached to noun phrases (NP's) at some level of  representation.2) 
Logically-minded linguists have long recognized that this can be done 
most successfully with the import of logical formulae containing 
identical (bound) variables representing the relation of coreference. Thus, 
the "typical" cases of coreference are exemplified by the use of 
pronouns in the following sentences. (This, however, needs qualify-
ing.  3)) 
  (1) a. No prudent  mans drives when  hei is drunk. 
    b. Every  candidatei xpects that  hei  will lose. 
The pronouns occurring in these sentences can be regarded as analogous 
to the bound variables of formal  ogic.4) These sentences are related to 
the open sentences (or propositional functions) of (2), with the 
quantified NP's no prudent man and every candidate binding the relevant 
variables. (I leave open the exact nature of the processes involved here.) 
  (2) a. x drives when x is drunk 
    b. x expects that x willwin 
Partee (1972, 1975) refers to the type of pronouns just discussed as 
pronouns as variables. In addition, Partee argues that there is another 
type of pronoun which cannot be so described. Examples of such 
pronouns are seen in the following sentences. 
  (3) a. The  mans who gave  his paycheck to his wife was wiser than the 
 man. who gave it to his mistress. 
 b. Amanthan              whosometimes beats his. wife has more sense thi 
        enowho always gives in to  her.5)
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The pronouns it and her in the sentences of (3) literally go proxy for the 
antecedent NP's his paycheck and his wife, respectively. What is extra-
ordinary about these sentences is that the pronouns just mentioned are 
not related with their antecedents by the relation of coreference: in the 
normal interpretation, there are two paychecks and two wives, respec-
tively, involved in the situations designated by the sentences of (3). The 
relevant anaphoric relations in these cases are characterized asthe re-
lation of identity of sense, instead of coreference. The pronouns o 
described are referred to as pronouns of  laziness.° 
  Partee (1975) argues that ordinary pronouns are derived by two 
processes,  viz. as pronouns as variables (hereafter PAV) and as pronouns 
of laziness (POL). More specifically, she argues that if the antecedent is a 
proper name or a definite description, the sentence involving the 
anaphoric relation is "structurally  ambiguous".') Thus the sentence (4) 
can be analysed as related to (5), in which John binds the variables, or as 
derived from (6), in which he is substituted for the second occurrence of
John. 8) 
  (4)  Johni expects that  hei will win. 
  (5) [John-x] [x expects that x will win] 
  (6) John expects that John will win. 
According to her claims, if (4) is derived from (5), the pronoun is used as 
a  PAV, and if (4) is derived from (6), it is used as a POL. Although I do 
subscribe to the view adopted by Partee that (4) is "structurally 
ambiguous" in some way or other, I will show in what follows that the 
distinction between the PAV and POL is in fact irrelevant to the 
structural ambiguity of (4). 
  The problem whichimmediately arises with her analysis is: if he is 
derived by the POL process, since a proper name like John is normally 
regarded as having no sense (as opposed to reference, in the sense of 
 Frege)9), is it tenable at all to speak of "identity of sense" between the 
proper name and its anaphor? Although this question is intutively a 
legitimate one, and hence is worth serious investigation, it seems to be 
too philosophically involved, and I will no longer go into the matter here.
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  A more interesting problem is posed by the following sentences. 
  (7) a.  John'si brother hates  himi. 
    b. The girl who kissed  Billi loves  himi. 
According to Partee's conceptions, the anaphoric relation holding in the 
sentences of (7) must be unambiguously that of POL, because the 
anaphoric relation in question cannot be that of  PAV, as the 
impossibility of (8) shows. 
 (8)a?*9{Everyone's.      .-brother hates  himi.10) 
           No  one'si 
    b. ?* The girl who kissed everyonei                                    loves  himi.
                           no  ones 
In the sentences of (8), if the anaphoric relation were possible, the 
relation could only be that of  PAV, because the antecedents are such 
quantified NP's as everyone and no one. (See fn. 3.) But in these cases 
the relation of variable binding, which should be at work in the PAV 
processes, does not hold for the quantified NP's and their  anaphors.") 
This shows that the anaphoric relation of PAV is impossible in the paral-
lel structure (7). Therefore only the relation of POL is possible in (7). 
However, consider the fact that the sentences of (9) are also permissible, 
where so-called backward  pronominalizationl  2) is involved. 
  (9) a.flisi•brother hates  Johns  13) 
    b. The girl who kissed  himiloves  Billi. 
This observation apparently eads us to the hypothesis that the backward 
pronominalization is possible (only) between aPOL and its antecedent. 
  However, that this hypothesis incorrect is shown by the following 
examples. 
  (10) a. Rockford claims to have found Smith's  murdereri but 
        Columbo also claims to have found  himi. 
     b. Although Columbo claims to havefound  himi, Rockford also 
        claims to have found Smith's  murdereri. 
The sentence  (10a) is ambiguous: it can be interpreted as involving either 
only one  'Smith's murderer' or two persons uspected as  such.14) In the 
former eading, the pronoun him is related with its antecedent by the
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(normal) relation of coreference. In the latter reading, the anaphoric 
relation is that of "identity of sense". Note that the use of pronoun in 
the latter case is a typical example of a POL. But consider  (10b). In this 
sentence, only the "coreference-reading" s possible, in which only one 
Smith's murderer (in its referential use) is  involved.15) This fact 
convincingly indicates that the backward-pronominalization is impossible 
between a POL and its antecedent. 
  Now the facts  (7)—(10) show that the notion of POL is irrelevant to 
cases like (4): the pronouns of (7) could be only POL's, as is shown by 
the impossibility of (PAV's) in (8). But, although the backward 
pronominalization is permissible in the parallel structure (9), the 
backward pronominalization is in fact impossible between a "genuine" 
POL and its antecedent, asis shown by the absence of the POL reading in 
 (10b). Therefore it is reasonable to abandon the notion of POL in the 
cases (4) and (7), and reserve it for cases like (3) and  (10a). Nevertheless, 
I still subscribe to the view that sentences like (4) are "structurally am-
biguous". Then, how should the structural ambiguity be  characterized  ? 
I will  turn to this problem in the next section.
1.2 Intuitively, Partee's analysis of (4), to the effect that it can be 
derived either from (5) or from (6), seems to be legitimate.What makes it
questionalbe is her use of the notion of POL in the latter case, for the 
reasons I have mentioned above. 
  A closer look at the sentence (4) shows that it can be viewed in two 
ways, without adopting such notions as POL. 
  (4)  Johni expects that  hei will win. 
This can be done in terms of the notion property. One way to look at (4) 
is to regard John as having the property "x expects that x will win", or 
the property of expecting-oneself-to-win, and another way to look at it is 
to regard John as having the property "x expects that John will win". At 
first sight, this analysis may seem to be identical with Partee's, the 
difference being that in the present analysis the pronoun in the latter 
reading is not derived via the process of POL: rather, its derivation is
triggered by the relation of coreference between constants (i.e. between
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two occurrences of John, in this case), in contrast o the relation of 
coreference between variables, as seen in (5). Such being the case, we 
must stipulate that there are two types of coreference: one type of 
coreference is represented in terms of identity of (bound) variables, and 
the other type of coreference is represented in terms of identity of 
constant erms at the level of logical  form.16) For convenience, I  will 
refer to those pronouns which are related with their antecedents by the 
relation of identity of variables (or variable binding) as pronouns of 
(bound) variable coreference (PVC) and those related with their 
antecedents by the relation of identity of constants as pronouns of 
constant coreference (PCC). Now it will be seen that the "structural 
ambiguity" of (4) should be characterized in terms of PVC and PCC. 
Why such a distinction is necessary will be made clearer in the next 
chapter. 
2. Types of Coreference and "Sloppy Identity" 
2.1 Problems concerning verb phrase deletion  (VPD) have been discussed 
extensively in such recent papers as Sag (1976, 1977) and Williams 
(1977). These two authors assume that the level of representation 
relevant to VPD is the level of logical  forml  7), and they also agree in 
adopting the crucial device of the lambda-calculus in the logical 
representation. The  lambda-calculus is alogical device by means of which 
one can express some individual's  property.18) Thus consider the 
following sentence. 
  (11)  Betsyi loves  heri dog, and  Sandy does too. 
The right conjunct, which has undergone VPD, is ambiguous: on one 
reading, Sandy loves Betsy's dog, and on the other reading, Sandy loves 
her own dog. In the latter reading, the deleted VP contains the pronoun 
 her  • which is not referentially identical with the pronoun contained in 
the antecedent VP of the left conjunct. In this case, the identity 
condition on VPD ignores difference of pronominal reference. Hence the 
term "sloppy identity" as against Chomsky's (1965) notion of "strict 
identity"  condition.'  9) In what follows, I will use the term "sloppy 
reading" to refer to the reading involving sloppy identity  (i.e. the latter
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reading), and "non-sloppy reading" to refer to the reading involving strict 
identity (Le. the former eading). 
  In the system developed by Sag and Williams, the non-sloppy reading 
is represented by the logical form (12).20) 
  (12)  Betsyi Xx (x loves  heri dog) and  Sandyi Xy (y loves  heri dog) 
In (12)  Xx (...) and Xy (...) are alphabetic variants21), guaranteeing the 
possibility of VPD. On the sloppy reading of (11), the semantic rules first 
derive the formula (13). 
  (13) Betsyi Xx (x loves  heri dog) and  Sandy Xy (y loves  herj dog) 
Applying a semantic rule which Sag calls  PRO-*BV to both the 
conjuncts22), we obtain the logical form (14). 
  (14)  Betsyi Xx (x loves x's dog) and  Sandy Xy (y loves y's dog) 
Again, Xx (...) and Xy (...) are alphabetic variants, allowing deletion. 
  The basic idea underlying the approach adopted by Sag and Williams 
is that VPD is possible only if the individuals denoted by the NP's in the 
subject positions of both the conjuncts have an identical property, which 
is represented by the alphabetic variance of the lambda-calculi. More 
plainly, on the non-sloppy reading represented by the formula (12), 
Betsy and Sandy share the property of loving Betsy's dog, and on the 
sloppy reading represented by the formula (14), Betsy and Sandy share 
the property of loving their respective dogs. And also to be noted is that 
Sag and Williams implicitly assume that the real root of the ambiguity of 
the right conjunct of (11) is the "structural ambiguity" of the left 
conjunct, and this ambiguity is to be characterized in our terms as 
follows: in the logical form (12) which expresses the non-sloppy reading, 
the pronoun  here is represented asan individual constant, while in the 
logical form (14), which expresses the sloppy reading, the pronoun is 
represented as a variable bound by the lambda-operator. Now it is 
obvious that this ambiguity correlates with the "structural ambiguity" 
characterized in terms of the PVC and PCC, which we have seen in  §1.1. 
In the following sections, I will present several arguments for the 
correlation between the sloppy/non-sloppy ambiguity and the PVC/PCC 
ambiguity.
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2.2.1. Consider the following sentence. 
  (15) Every  philosopherithinks that hei is terrific, and that  linguist] 
       does  , too. 
This sentence does not show the ambiguity present in such sentences a  
(11): only the sloppy reading on which that  linguist] thinks that  hei is 
terrific is possible, and it is impossible to interpret the right conjunct as: 
  (16) ... and that  linguist] thinks that hei (=every philosopher) is 
       terrific. 
This is a natural consequence of our assumption that the pronoun  hei in 
the left conjunct of (15), its antecedent being a quantified NP every 
philosopher, can only be a PVC.23) (See also fn. 3.) Thus the logical 
form for the sentence (15) is represented only by (17). 
  (17) Vxphilosopher(x  Xy  (y thinks that y is terrific))and [that 
     linguist]  j Xp (p thinks that p is  terrific)24) 
In this formula,  Ay (...) and Xp (...) are alphabetic variants, and deletion 
is permitted. The present analysis differs from the one developed by Sag 
and Williams, in that in our analysis, the logical form (17) is derived from 
(15) directly, while in theirs this logical form is derived via  PRO—>BV. 
(See,  however,  §3.)The problem with Sag and Williams is that in cases 
like (15), where the antecedent ofa pronoun is a quantified NP, the rule 
 PRO—>BV would apply obligatorily, whereas this rule is, by definition, 
optional.25) But if we dispense with it, and if we derive the formula (17) 
directly, what we have to do is to determine whether the relevant 
pronoun is a PVC or a PCC, the pronoun in the present example being a 
typical PVC, because its antecedent is a quantified NP every philosopher, 
which directly follows from the discussion i  §1.1.26) 
2.2.2 The sentences of (18) are unambiguously non-sloppy. 
  (18) a.  John'si father hates  himi, and  Harry's] father does , 
       too. hate h•                  lin) 
      b. The girl who kissed  Maxi loves  himi, and the girl who kicked 
 Jim does  , too. (  =loves  himi) 
The fact that these sentences lack the sloppy reading is directly 
connected with what we have observed about the sentences (7)—(9)
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above: the pronouns occurring in the left conjunct of the sentences in
(18) can neither be PVC's (as can be seen from (8)) nor POL's (as can be 
seen from (9) and  (lob)), and they can only be PCC's. Thus the only 
logical form possible for (18) is represented by(19). 
  (19) a.  [NpJohn'si father]  j Xx  (x hates himi) and 
 [NpHarry'sk  father]1  Xy (y hates himi) 
     b. [NpThe girl [swho kissed Maxi]  ]i  Ax (x loves himi) and 
 [Npthe girl [swho kicked  Jhnk]  ]i  Xy (y loves  himi) 
Sag (1977) purports to get over this problem by setting up a constraint 
on  PRO-3BV, restated here as (20). 
  (20) The only pronounsthat can become bound variables are those 
      that bear the same index as the argument of the  A-predicate, 
      which ... is the surface subject. (Sag (1977), pp. 92-93.) 
But such a constraint in fact lacks explanatory value: the reason why the 
pronoun  himi cannot be converted into a variable x is simply that  himi is 
not coreferential with x, which is coreferential with  NP1, and this suffices 
to explain the phenomenon athand. Rather, there should be a constraint 
which bars such logical forms as: 
  (21) a.  *John  Ax  ([x's father] hates x) 
      b. *Max  Ax  (  [the girl [who kissed  x]  ] hates x) 
Intuitively, a sentence like "John's father hates him" cannot be used to 
attribute properties to John; rather, this is a statement about John's 
father. The constraint against he logical forms of (21) makes this 
intuition explicit. Indeed the existing semantic theory is already 
equipped with such a constraint, in terms of the "scope" of variable 
binding. See fn. 11. The facts we have seen so far lend support o the 
view that the pronouns occurring in (18) can only be PCC's, and that 
there is a correlation between the distributions of PCC's and the 
non-sloppy reading.
2.2.3 It will be seen in this section that the actual distribution of the 
sloppy/non-sloppy ambiguity is subject to the preceding contexts which 
specify whether the pronouns used in the subsequent discourse should be 
a PVC or a PCC. Thus consider the sentence (22).
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  (22)  Melvini claims that  hei is poor, and  Petei does  _______, too. 
The sentence (22) in isolation is ambiguous, having the reading on which 
Pete claims that Melvin is poor (=non-sloppy) and the reading on which 
Pete claims that he himself is poor  (=sloppy). But the same sentence in 
the following discourse isno longer ambiguous. 
  (23) Speaker A:  Whoeveri claims that  hei is poor is actually  rich.27) 
      Speaker  B: Then, Melvin and Pete are rich, for  Melviniclaims 
      that  hei is poor, and Petek does  , too. 
In this discourse, the same sentence as (22) has only the sloppy reading, 
because in this context he in "Melvin claims that he is poor" can only be 
a PVC, for the normal interpretation here is that the property of 
claiming-oneself-to-be-poor is at issue, and that this property, which is 
naturally represented bythe use of bound variables, isbeing attributed to 
Melvin and Pete. Thus, the logical form for this reading is (24). 
  (24)  Melvin) Xx (x claims that x is poor) and Petek Xy (y claims that 
      y is poor) 
For Sag and Williams, it would be necessary toset up a condition stating 
that  PROBV is obligatory in contexts like these. But we have only to 
state that the relevant pronoun is a PVC. 
  Next consider the discourse (25), which contains the same sentence as 
(22). 
  (25) Speaker A: Who claims that Melvin is poor? 
      Speaker B: Well,  Melvini claims that  heiis poor, and  Petek does   
,  too. 
This time, the same sentence is unambiguously non-sloppy. This follows 
from the fact that what is at issue here is the property of claiming-
Melvin-to-be-poor, and this property is being attributed to Melvin and 
Pete. In this case, only (26), which represents the non-sloppy reading, is 
the proper logical form. 
 (26) Melvin.J            Xx (x claims that he-is poor) and Petek Xy (y claims  J 
      that hei.is poor) 
The pronoun  hey in this logical form is straightforwardly a PCC. Again, 
for Sag and Williams, it would be necessary to set up a condition which 
blocks  PRO-BV in cases like this. But the present analysis, which has
recourse 
naturally 
(22).
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to the distinction between a PVC and a PCC, accounts more 
for the presence or absence of the ambiguity in sentences like
2.2.4 In  §1.2 I have characterized the "structural ambiguity" of the 
sentence (4) in terms of whether the pronoun occurring there is a PVC or 
a PCC. Now consider the sentence (27), in which quantification is
involved. 
  (27) Only Nixoni believes that  hei is innocent. 
This sentence is "semantically ambiguous", i.e. the two readings of this 
sentence differ in truth conditions. On one reading, Nixon and no other 
person than Nixon believes that he (himself) is innocent; it can  still be 
true if someone lse believes than Nixon is innocent. In other words, on 
this reading, Nixon and no other person than Nixon has the property "x 
believes that x is innocent". On the other reading, this sentence is true if 
Nixon and no other person than Nixon believes that Nixon is innocent; it
can still be true if someone other than Nixon believes that he himself is 
innocent. In other words, on this reading, only Nixon and no one else has 
the property "x believes that Nixon is innocent". This ambiguity is 
conveniently represented by the use of the lambda-calculus. 
  (28) only Nixoni Xx (x believes that  hei is innocent) 
  (29) only  Nixoni Xx (x believes that x is innocent) 
The logical form (29) represents he first reading, and the logical form 
(28) represents he latter reading. The semantic ambiguity in question is
characterized by the distinction between the PVC and PCC, which are 
derived separately in the present analysis. Note that this sentence poses a 
very difficult problem for Sag and Williams: they are forced to derive 
(29) from (28) via  PRO-BV. But (28) and (29) are semantically distinct. 
Such being the case, if they are to stick to this rule, they will have to 
admit of a semantic rule (i.e.  PRO-)-BV) which changes meaning. But 
there is no such rule known to exist in the literature in print, regardless of 
whether one takes the interpretive s mantics or the generative s mantics 
position. Thus if they are to treat sentences like (27) properly, they are 
forced to abandon  PRO-*BV, and derive the two logical forms, (28) and
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(29),  directly.28)
3. Final Remarks 
  Throughout this paper I have argued that the distinction between the 
constant and the variable is effective in the semantic analysis of 
pronominal anaphora. But I. have left open the precise nature of the 
mechanism involved in determining whether a given pronoun should be 
treated as a variable (PVC) or as a constant (PCC). This problem awaits 
further investigations. 
  However, the need for the distinction between the two types of 
coreference is by now obvious, as seen in the treatment of the so-called 
 "sloppy identity" that is associated with VPD. Sag and  Williams have 
implicitly assumed that such a distinction at the level of logical form is at 
work, but their analyses are faced with a lot of difficulties, mainly due to 
their failure to observe the theoretical significance of the distinction in 
question. A rule like  PRO-->BV could not have been argued for, if they 
had been fully aware of the real status of such a semantic rule.29) 
  The validity of the distinction between the PVC and the PCC seems to 
have further empirical implications. More specifically, it has been 
recognized, since Postal (1970), that the anaphoric relations with 
non-definite NP's as antecedents are subject to stronger constraints han 
those with definite  antecedents,30) and these "stronger" constraints 
could be essentially identical with those on variable binding, which I have 
given in fn. 11. If this is the case, we would have another case in which 
the distinction between the variable and constant in logical form is of 
empirical nd theoretical validity.
                      NOTES 
 *This is a radically revised version of a paper which originated as a preliminary 
to my M. A. thesis, which is to be submitted in January, 1979. I am grateful to 
Prof. Y.  Mori for invaluable comments on the earlier manuscript. Thanks are also 
due to M. Yamanashi, who carefully read the manuscript and provided me with 
insightful comments. Finally, discussions with the fellow students at Osaka U have 
been helpful.
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1) By "linguistically relevant coreference" I refer to the relation of coreference in 
  which anaphoric devices (typically, pronouns) are involved, and exclude such 
   cases as: 
   (i) The morning star is more beautiful than the evening star. 
  (ii) The unicorn finally discovered around square. 
  In (i), the italicized NP's denote the identical object, and in this sense they are 
  coreferential. In (ii), the italicized NP's are coreferential in the sense that they 
  have no referents. But in neither of these cases is anaphora involved, and 
   therefore such cases should be excluded from the linguistic considerations. I 
  leave the detailed discussion on the "linguistically relevant identity" to my M. 
   A. thesis. See Postal (1970), pp. 439-442, for discussions. 
2) I leave open the question of what is the relevant level of representation for 
  specifying the relation of coreference. In this paper I will not be committed to 
   any specific theoretical framework. 
3) This remark needs qualifying because it will invite objections, which would be 
  directed to the idea that coreference is "typically" involved in the sentences of 
   (2), because the antecedent NP's are quantified NP's no prudent man and 
  every candidate, which have no referents. It is perfectly normal to ask, "How 
   can you speak of coreference when no referent is involved?" IndeedPartee 
  (1972) Lasnik (1976) and others argue that the anaphoric relations of (2) are 
   not the relation of coreference, but the relation of variable binding. However, 
   I regard the anaphoric relations in these examples as those of coreference 
  holding between the arbitrary members of a set specified by the relevant quan-
  tified NP in the domain of discourse. This idea is implicit in Wasow (1972), 
  pp.  168  —169. 
4) The resemblance between the pronouns of natural anguage and the variables 
   of formal logic has been repeatedly emphasized by logicians. E.g. see Quine 
  (1953), pp. 102-103. 
5) The example (3a) is a famous example from Karttunen (1969) and the 
  example (3b) is taken from Geach (1976). 
6) The term "pronoun of laziness" is due to a philosopher P. T. Geach. 
7) Partee (1975) has adopted the term "structural ambiguity" to refer to the 
  ambiguity in question, because the two processes of the derivation often lead 
   to the equivalent interpretation. However, see the discussion in  §  2.2.4. 
8) In the derivation from (5), the NP John is used essentially as a quantifier. This 
   treatment of NP's is characteristic of Montague Grammar. See Partee  (1975b). 
9) This remark may be objected to on the basis of such examples as: 
   (i) Giorgione was so-called because of his size. 
   As Quine (1953, pp.  139-141) observes,given that "Giorgione = Barbarelli", 
   (ii) cannot be true when (i) is true. 
       Barbarelli was  so-calledbecause of his size. 
   This may be eivdence for the claim that proper names do have sense (or 
   intension): otherwise the referential opacity of (i) would not have arised. 
   Incidentally, in Montague Grammear all NP's are treated primarily as 
   intensional. This problem seems to be worth further investigations. See Partee 
  (1975b) for discussions.
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10) Not all speakers find the sentence (8a) unacceptable on the relevant reading. 
   Reinhart (1976) discusses this sentence in connection with (9a). See fn. 13. 
11) For discussions on the "scope" of variable binding, see Postal (1970, fn. 13), 
   and Lasnik (1976). In sum, variable binding is considered to be possible only if 
   the quantified antecedent both precedes and "kommands" (a revised notion of
   Langacker's "command", due to Lasnik) its anaphor. In connection with my 
   remarks in fn. 3, we can safely say that variable binding is a special caseof 
    coreference. 
12) By "backward pronominalization" I refer to the cases in which a pronoun 
   occurs to the left of its antecedent in the surface configuration. 
13) Note that although (9b) can be accounted for by the conditions on 
   pronominalization proposed by Ross (1967) and Langacker (1969) in termsof 
    "precede-command", (9a) is left unaccountable for. Some notions like 
   "kommand" (see fn. 11) would be necessary. Reinhart (1976) observes that 
   those speakers who accept (8a) find (9a) unacceptable, and those who accept 
   (9a) find (8a) unacceptable. This fact is captured by her notion of the 
    "c-command omain". 
14) This ambiguity correlates with the ambiguity (referential/attributive use) of 
   definite descriptions discussed by  Donnellan (1966). When the definite 
    description is used referentially, the "coreference reading' in which only one 
   murderer is involved arises, and when it is used attributively, the "POL 
 reading' in which two persons described as such are involved arises. 
15) This observation is essentially due to Wasow (1972, pp. 171-172). Put in 
    another way, the backward pronominalization is impossible betweena
    non-referential NP and its anaphor. A fuller characterization of the backward 
    pronominalization with a non-referential antecedent will be seen in my M. A. 
   thesis (in preparation). 
16) This implies that at the level of logical representation coreference must be 
   represented in two ways: one type of coreference is specified by the use of 
    variables, and another type of coreference by the use of constants with
   identical indices attached to them. 
17) Their work is essentially within the framework outlined in Chomsky (1975). 
    For them, logical form is the output of semantic interpretation rules working 
    on surface structure, although there are minor differences between their 
    approaches, deriving mainly from their different conceptions of the notion 
    "surface structure". 
18) An ordinary logical representation of (i) is something like (ii). 
   (i) John loves Mary 
   (ii) love (John, Mary) 
    By means of the lambda-calculus, one can abstract he argument which serves 
   as the subject, which is followed by the expression corresponding to the 
   predicate, as in  (iii). (Hence, the lambda-operator is also dubbed abstraction 
 operator.) 
   (iii) Xx (love (x, Mary)) [John] 
    Although (iii) is a usual form of representation, I follow the convention 
   adopted by Sag, which reflects the word order of natural anguageas in: 
   (iv) John Xx (x loves Mary)
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   This logical form is interpreted as   `John has the property of loving Mary". 
   For detailed accounts of the lambda-calculus, ee Carnap (1958, pp. 129ff) 
 and  -7tllwood et al. (1977, pp. 155-157). Sag and Williams have independently 
   borrowed this idea from Partee's transformational extension of Montague 
   Grammar. See Partee (1975b) pp. 265-269. 
19) See Chomsky (1965), pp. 145-147. The happy term "sloppy identity" is due 
   to Ross (1967b, pp. 189-191; 1969, pp. 268-275). Note that this 
   phenomenon is not confined to VPD; it is also associated with Sluicing, as in 
   (i), and with so-called "semantic anaphora" as in  (ii). 
   (i)  Haroldi knows how to crane  his neck, but  Ij don't know how 
   (ii)  Fred kissed  hisj wife, and  Jackj imitated  himj. 
20) For the rest of this paper, I follow  Sag's notation rather than Williams', who 
   assumes that VPD is a semantic rule that copies the antecedent VP into the 
   position of the missing VP, which is empty from the beginning. (For him, 
   VPD is not a transformation.) Thus, for Williams the logical form for (11) 
   would be something like (i). 
   (i)  Betsyi [vp Xx (x loves  her dog)] and  Sandy [vp A A  A] 
   But this difference is not as large as it appears, the reason mainly deriving 
    from their conceptions of "surface structure". 
21) For the purpose of this paper, it is sufficient to note that two lambda-
   expressions are "alphabetic variants" if they differ only with regard to 
    variable letters. By this, one can conveniently represent the "identical 
    property". 
22) The rule  PRO-'BV converts those pronouns that bear the same index as the 
    argument of the lambda-expression i to variables (optional). Williams also 
    proposes a rule to the same effect, which is dubbed "Pronoun Rule", and 
   Chomsky (1975, 1977) assumes asimilar rule. Note that this rule is a rule that 
    converts constants (pronoun) into variables. It is questionable whether such a 
    rule is permissible on the logical ground, except for existential generalization, 
    which says that from F(a) one can infer that  HxF(x). E.g., from "Socrates is 
    mortal" one can infer that  `there is at least one man such that he is mortal".
    But  PRO—)13V has nothing to do with such logical inferences. More problems 
   for  PRO—>BV  will be presented in  §  2.2. 
23) It is possible to account for this fact from a different angle: one can say that 
   the reason for the impossibility of the reading (16) is simply that the scope of 
   variable binding with the quantified NP's is strictly sentence-bound. (See 
   Chomsky (1977), p. 34.) The logical form (i), which purports to represent the 
    non-sloppy reading, is  ill-formed because the right conjunct contains a free 
   variable (y). 
   (i)  *Vxphilosopher (x Xy (y thinks that y is terrific)) and that  linguistj Xp (p 
       thinks that y is terrific) 
    But this explanation is also based on the assumption that the relevant 
    pronoun should be represented as a variable in logical form. 
24) This logical form is radically simplified. 
25) See fn. 22. This is clearly stated in Sag (1977), p. 90. 
26) See fn. 3. The property of variable binding is not limited to those NP's 
    quantified by such items as every and no. Consider the following examples.
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27)
28)
29)
30)
t 
    The typical American 
(i)The average politician thinks that he is competent. 
    Either Bill or Fred 
It seems that those NP's which do not function as individual constants have 
the property of being related with their anaphors by the relation of variable 
binding. 
Wh-words like whoever have essentially the same characteristics as quantifier 
words. Note that this idea is not entirely new: e.g. see Jespersen (1924), pp. 
302-305. Also see fn. 30. 
There is a way out for them: if they assume that only is semantically 
complex, as Lakoff (1970, p. 393) argues, they can avoid the difficulty. On 
this analysis, the sentence (27) would have the following two logical forms. 
 (i)  Nixon Xx (x believes that  hei is innocent) and [no one other than 
 Nixoni]  j Xy (y believes that  hei is innocent) 
(ii)  Nixoni Xx (x believes that x is innocent) and [no one other than  Nixoni] i 
    Xy (y believes that y is innocent) 
The logical forms (i) and (ii) are  essentially identical with (28) and (29), 
respectively. The derivation from the surface (27) onto (i) and  (ii) (if one 
follows the interpretivist framework) would be analogous to a reversed 
process of Conjunction Reduction. 
Sag (1977, p. 90) explicitly notes that the logical forms (ii) and (iii), which 
derive from  (i), are "logically equivalent". 
 (i)  Betsy loves  heri dog. 
 (ii)  Betsyi  Xx (x loves  heri dog)  > 
(iii)  Betsy Xx (x loves x's dog)  PRO-43V 
However, as it obvious from the discussion so far, the really interesting point 
is not  their  "logical equivalence", but, rather, how they differ. Sag's remarks  
,  concerning the rule  PRO—.13V make me wonder how he conceives of the real 
implications of this rule. 
Chomsky's (1977) analysis of anaphora indicates that this is not confined to 
the non-definite anaphora cases: he argues that  nondefinite NP's, wh-words 
which  ` cross-over' , and stressed NP's behave the same way with respect to 
anaphora, as seen in the following. 
 (i) ?*The woman  hei loved betrayed a  politiciani. 
 (ii)  ?*Whoi did the woman  hei loved betray t? 
(iii) ?*The woman  hei loved betrayed  JOHNS. 
These facts suggest hat the analysis of pronouns in terms of the distinction 
between variables and constants will turn out to be valid in a wider range of 
anaphoric phenomena than we assume at present.
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